Predicting the decline in Apple’s brand equity

Back in 2011 I mocked the brand equity industry for playing catch-up in valuing Apple.  Everywhere I look the evidence is that these brand equity valuations rise long after the stock price rises, and decline long after it declines.

It’s the same story for predictions of sales success.

In short they predict nothing.  They just tell us things we already knew.

By 2012 Apple was entrenched as the most valuable brand in the world, not surprising given that much earlier it had achieved the highest market capitalisation.  Brandz gushed that Apple’s brand equity had risen a further 19% in their estimation.

Since then I’ve not heard any reports from the brand equity industry predicting a decline in Apple’s value.  Meanwhile its stock price has almost halved since September 2012 (see graph below).

Here’s my prediction – soon (ie mid-late 2013) the brand equity firms will announce a  decline in Apple’s brand equity.  Even though Apple’s sale revenue has continued to climb (see chart 2 below and this link).  Even in traditional markets like the US it has increased its market share in phones and computers.

So if the brand equity firms do downgrade Apple’s brand equity it will have to be based on its stock price.  What value do these equity values give then, when anyone can look up the stock price of any public company and be many months ahead of the brand equity valuation?

Chart 1 – APPL Stock price

Chart 2 – APPL Sales revenues

APPL

Applesales$

Manager’s Knowledge of Marketing Principles: The Case of New Product Development

Citation
Cierpicki, S, Wright, M, and Sharp, B (2000) “Managers’ Knowledge of Marketing Principles: The Case of New Product Development”, Journal of Empirical Generalisations in Marketing Science, Vol 5, No.3

Abstract
Do marketing managers have well-established marketing principles to guide decision making? We addressed this question by examining 15 principles of new product development obtained from an expert panel of Australian senior marketing practitioners. Of these 15, three turned out to be tautologies, six had at least some empirical support, and six were partly or fully contradicted by empirical studies. In examining the literature for evidence, we were also able to identify five well established ‘empirical generalisations’ about new product development. These results indicate that while principles of new product development do exist, there are fewer of them than we might have thought, and Australian practitioners appear unable to distinguish between good and bad principles.

Download the complete article in PDF

Making marketing science easier to read & understand – suggested format for articles

I sometimes read academic articles in very different disciplines, like medicine and biology. They have some different formats than we have in marketing. Often their articles are much shorter, yet just as detailed when it comes to describing the research, how it was done and what were the results.

Why are marketing journal articles so long? And so obscure?

Do they need to be?

Now that publishing has gone online we don’t need to be subject to the same constraints as in the past. I wonder if the best format would be for articles to be about 800 words long, a clear exposition of what was done and what was found and what it might mean. After the article there could be a moderated/refereed Question & Answer section. This would be enormously useful, and take the pressure off authors to write perfectly, fully anticipating the needs of all readers on the first go.

Extensive details, like the whole questionnaire or data coding frame could be made available by links.

Brand Equity Consultants Fail Again

Back in mid 2011 I noted that Starbucks had been performing strongly.

I also noted the lack of consultants predicting this rebound. People who pitch these brand equity metrics claim they can predict future consumer behaviour and brand performance (even sharemarket performance). But evidence shows their predictions are lousy. I chuckled when BrandZ at long last caught up with the stock market and ranked Apple as the most valuable brand.

Back to Starbucks… when would the brand equity firms catch up?

Then mid 2012 BrandZ announced that Starbucks had made its list of top increases in brand value with a staggering 43% increase over their 2011 valuation.

Hardly much of a prediction when Starbucks had just announced their 11th consecutive record breaking quarter!

A few months later and BrandKeys listed Starbucks among their top improvers for 2012 up a massive 55 places in rank (but still far below Dunkin Donuts)!

Why would anyone pay for these brand equity metrics when they can read the news months (even years) earlier by just buying a newspaper?

Loyalty/Engagement scores don’t predict the future

I took the full list of Brand Keys 2011 Engagement Award ranks and correlated them again sales gains. What a surprise! A correlation of 0.4 but it’s round the other way…..

i.e. the better the Band Keys rank the less the sales gain !

Brand Keys, who sell these surveys, claim that these award scores will predict a brand’s future. Seems like you’ve absolutely got to know which numbers to use and which to ignore, which can only be done after the event. That’s not prediction, it’s weaving a story afterwards (to sell a product).

Pearson’s correlation 0.39 (or 0.11 for just the 5 top ranked brands)

Data sources:
Brand Keys Loyalty Awards 2011 – http://www.brandkeys.com/awards/index.cfm
Business Week Car Sales – http://online.wsj.com/mdc/public/page/2_3022-autosales.html

Professor Byron Sharp

PS it isn’t quite technically correct to use Pearson’s correlation for a continuous variable against a rank order variable, but in this case converting both to ranks and using a Spearman’s correlation produces essentially the same result.

Brand Revitalisation

Many marketers will look forward to this new year with some trepidation. They face a situation where:

- The brand plan is going to call for substantial growth (in sales and profit contribution), even if last year this wasn’t achieved.
- Yet the advertising budget won’t be larger. The amount of time ‘on air’ has shrunk over the years as more money has gone to in-store activity (largely price promotions), and the media budget has been spread more thinly across more media options as various digital ‘new media’ were added to the mix.
- More than half of sales occur on-deal, hardly anyone pays the normal price anymore for this brand.
- There is the suspicion that the normal price is too high and so sometimes encourages consumers to pause and break habits to look at other brands.
- The brand has more variants (flavours, sizes) than ever before. This was justified on the basis of appealing to new different consumers, and winning shelf space (but the brand has no more shelf space than it had some years ago, probably less – not that this is carefully measured/tracked). Handling and production costs are consequently higher, and it’s suspected there are more stock-outs of the main formulation.

Even for large, successful, profitable brands this situation looks a little bleak. It seems very hard to see where substantial growth is going to come from. This makes marketers susceptible to consultants selling “miracle cures”. In marketing these cures usually speak about restoring brand equity and differentiation, getting consumers to fall in love with the brand again. All sorts of things are put forward as candidates to do this…from loyalty schemes to new advertising pre-testing approaches. Many grasp at these straws, hoping for at least a temporary win that they can put on their CV.

So how can a marketing manager get their brand out of this situation? How can they realistically put a plan in place that has a reasonable chance of delivering growth?

An important place to start is to get a few crucial metrics in place that reveal:
- what mental structures make is easier (more likely) for a consumer to buy our brands? FInd out then make sure your advertising reinforces these.
- how many people did we reach today with ‘advertising’? everyday.
- how many people physically came within close distance of our brand today?
- what things made it a little harder (less likely) for someone to buy our brand?

The Invention of the MBA

I read recently in a history book about the invention of the MBA at Harvard. Business had been taught previously but after the stock market panic of 1907 it was felt there was a need for “better trained businessmen” so Harvard established a Graduate School and the MBA admitting 59 candidates in 1908.

Harvard developed their own definition of business: ‘making things to sell, at a profit, decently’.

“Two basic activities were identified by this definition: manufacturing, the act of production; and merchandising or marketing, the act of distribution”
- (The Modern Mind by Peter Watson, page 79).

How sensible.

And what a great success the MBA was. So successful that all sorts of institutions now offer MBAs. And in many cases they bear little resemblance to the original. There are shoddy institutions with low academic standards offering MBAs but also old prestigious Universities have jumped on the bandwagon sometimes without the appropriate staff – old economics courses get rebranded as “MBA” and much teaching is done by part-time consultants.

The MBA has been such a marketplace success that product quality, and academic standards have not held up strongly.

It’s a pity because that original idea was clearly a winner.

I wonder if the emphasis on case studies was part of the problem. Case studies are fine for teaching analysis and consensus building, but they can distract from real knowledge. They tend to reinforce old myths and group-think. The teaching of engineers and doctors placing more emphasis on fundamental principles. Also the case study approach requires good moderators, rather than researchers at the top of their game. So MBA schools are staffed by many non researchers, or the research and the classroom become separated from one another.

As I said, it’s a pity because the original idea of the MBA was clearly a winner. “Making things to sell, at a profit, decently”.

What’s wrong in the house of academia, and a suggestion how to fix it

Presented to the Australia & NZ Marketing Academy Conference December 2012.

Marketing has a small ‘crisis literature’ where academics themselves bemoan the lack of real-world importance of academic research into marketing. For example, “Is Marketing Academia Losing Its Way”, Journal of Marketing, 2009.

Back in 1989 John Rossiter documented the growing gap between marketing scientists and consumer researchers even though they were supposed to be studying similar things. He warned the consumer researchers in particular that they were in danger of retreating into an Ivory Tower detached from the empirical findings regarding mass buying behaviour. Yet the trend continued unabated.

I myself, and colleagues, have had articles rejected from good journals when they chiefly documented a substantive finding about the world. My ‘favourite’ was when the editor of Marketing Science wrote to Jenni Romaniuk and myself about our work documenting the 60/20 law (ie it’s not 80/20). Effectively he said, “great stuff, I’m going to use this in my teaching, but we can’t publish it in Marketing Science because the journal tries to feature leading edge analysis whereas what you did was simple and transparent”. An open admission that Marketing Science is really a journal about engineering above science.

Yet around the same time the Nobel Prize for Physics was awarded to two Russian scientists who found a way of producing graphene, a single atom thick layer of carbon, this potentially extremely useful material had once been thought unlikely to exist in the real-world. They isolated graphene with a simple technique using common household sticky tape. Placing bulk graphite between two sheets of Scotch Tape they simply repeatedly pulled the tape apart removing layers of atoms until they achieved graphene. A colleague remarked that it showed you could still win a Nobel Prize “for mucking around in the lab”. In physics there is still respect for substantive discoveries.

The defence or excuse from marketing academia is that we have been placing our emphasis on rigour over relevance. But recent shocking findings in marketing academia, other social sciences, and even medical research have exposed the myth of improved quality. There have been been some high profile examples of scientists disgraced for falsifying results (including in marketing), while 10% of psychologists admit to falsifying data (but they presumably evaded discovery), and most admitted to sometimes practicing dubious practices like selectively reporting the studies “that worked” (and hiding those that did not support their hypotheses. Relatively higher rates of dubious practice were found among neuroscientists and cognitive & social psychologists. What do you think the rates would be in marketing?

A recent analysis (Wilhite and Fong 2012) of the dubious practice of journals encouraging (or bullying) authors to cite other articles from the same journal reported that the Journal of Retailing, Journal of Business Research, and Marketing Science were stand-outs at the very top of the suspect list – and that’s not a list of only marketing journals. Indeed marketing journals stood out from other disciplines as being into coercive citation to try to manipulate their citation impact scores.

In medical research standards are undoubtably higher. Yet when pharmaceutical companies seek to replicate findings reported in medical journals in most cases it can’t be done – even though they try hard, after all they are hoping to make money from the discovery. Many of the findings for cancer drugs are highly specific to particular circumstances (e.g. patients with particular genetic profiles) but the researchers didn’t explore these conditions, they just got lucky with their so far unrepeatable finding.

In marketing Hubbard & Armstrong (1994) documented that academics hardly ever try to replicate findings. We simply assume they are true (or perhaps not worth bothering with). Not surprising perhaps, when replications are done they usually are unable to repeat the original result. The same sort of scandal has hit a number of famous psychology experiments. “The conduct of subtle experiments has much in common with the direction of a theatre performance,” says Daniel Kahneman, a Nobel-prizewinning psychologist at Princeton University. Trivial details such as the day of the week or the colour of a room could affect the results, and these subtleties never make it into methods sections of research articles. Hmm, what’s the difference between a result that is so sensitive to many trivial, unknown and unpredictable details and no result at all? Why should we care about a finding that only occurs in high particular circumstances?

This is a bigger problem than fraud and dubious research practice. We need to stop publishing one-off flukes and explore the generalizability of findings – where and when does a result hold? How does it vary across product categories, brand size, brand age, different types of consumers, at different times, and so on.

Even large and varied data sets are being wasted in marketing when results presented as an average across many different conditions eg “marketing orientation is associated with higher financial performance r=0.28″. This tells us little about the real world; the average may even not actually apply in any of the major conditions.

We need to explore generalizability or otherwise our ‘discoveries’ tell us very little about the marketing world that we are supposed to be studying.

And we need to stop prematurely building shaky prescriptive theoretical edifices upon these doubtful, poorly documented findings.

If we don’t carefully and thoughtfully (call it ‘theory driven’ if you wish) examine a finding and how it varies (or not) across conditions then we are stuck with findings that probably were one-off events – with no way of telling. Currently we have to treat our findings as either applying to one historic data set covering one particular set of conditions that may never be seen again OR a result that generalises to all product categories, all countries, all seasons. Both views are preposterous, something in between is far more likely but there is a lot of land “in between”, it needs to be explored.

The dubious research practices discussed above come partly from ‘confirmation bias’, the fact that (marketing) scientists want to find evidence to support their hypotheses – and they want “a positive result” otherwise they lack the motivation to publish, or the belief that they will be accepted by any decent journal. Brodie and Armstrong (2001) suggested researchers adopt multiple competing hypotheses as a way of overcoming this bias. A worthy suggestion, but those implementing it tend to simply have their favoured hypothesis and the opposite – and they still obviously want to see their favoured hypothesis supported. So I would like to make a different suggestion. Let’s use research questions with the words “when”, “where” and “under what conditions”. Rather than black and white “does X cause Y” type hypotheses let’s ask “when does X cause Y?”, “does X cause Y in highly advertised categories?”, “is X more a cause of Y in developing economies?”. This is the basic work of science, documenting patterns in the real world. When do things vary and when to they not.

If researchers use “when”, “where” and “under what conditions” research questions they are aren’t trying to prove a proposition, so they don’t have to worry about failure, so they should hopefully be less likely to tweak data and pick findings. Also, very importantly, researchers will be documenting something useful about the world because they will be exploring generalizability.

PS The Nobel Prizes for Physics are awarded in line with Alfred Nobel’s criteria “to those who, during the preceding year, shall have conferred the greatest benefit on mankind” which explains the worthy emphasis on substantive fundings. Alexander Fleming’s accidental discovery of penicillin is another example of the Nobel prize committee valuing important discovery over display of academic prowess.

REFERENCES

ARMSTRONG, J. S., BRODIE, R. J. & PARSONS, A. G. “Hypotheses in marketing science: Literature review and publication audit.” Marketing Letters 12, 2 (2001): 171-187.

HUBBARD, R. & ARMSTRONG, J. S. “Replications and Extensions in Marketing: Rarely Published but Quite Contrary.” International Journal of Research in Marketing 11, (1994): 233-248.

REIBSTEIN, D. J., DAY, G. & WIND, J. “Guest editorial: is marketing academia losing its way?” Journal of Marketing 73, 4 (2009): 1-3.

ROSSITER, J. R. “Consumer Research and Marketing Science.” Advances in Consumer Research 16, (1989): 407-413.

WILHITE, A.W & FONG, E.A. “Coercive citation in academic publishing”. Science 335, (Feb 2012): 542-543.

Why stores stock many items that hardly sell

One line take-out: Each of us has a very different opinion on what the store should stock.  To win us all stores need a wide range.

The top selling 1000 items in a supermarket generate about half of its sales revenue. Which means that it’s vital that store managers make these items easy to see and buy – but that’s another story.

What I’d like to highlight today is that the other 30,000 or so items they stock sell very little volume.  This is what is sometimes called “the long tail”.

Stores try hard to weed out items that don’t sell.  So the typical store item does sell, but rarely. Stores are full of stock that barely moves while a tiny percentage of the items fly off the shelf.

This cam lead marketing consultants to advise retailers to pare back their range to concentrate on the items that deliver most of their revenue and profits. Yet this range (and cost) cutting strategy often fails.  Unfortunately, it’s been encouraged by recent research (some of it flawed) on consumer confusion mistakenly suggesting that smaller ranges will increase sales.

It’s true that stores look cluttered and complicated.  The average household only buys a few hundred different items from a supermarket in a year. That is, they do a lot of repeat buying of some items over and over.  So each buyer is looking for a few things out of the 30-50,000 on offer in the store.  That makes shopping sound like a horribly complicated task.

So why on earth would consumers be attracted to stores that stock so many items – most of which they don’t buy?  One notion is that consumers like the IDEA of choice, that they are attracted to variety but once they actually arrive in-store they fall back on their habitual nature and existing loyalties.

There may be a little truth in this explanation but the real reason is that consumers are very heterogeneous in the items they buy.  Remember that all those items in the store do sell, each item has its buyers.  So given that each of us is buying only a tiny proportion of the items in store the odds that my shopping basket will share anything in common with the person in front of me in the queue (or anyone else for that matter) is very low.  As I often point out, if you look at what’s in the shopping trolleys of fellow shoppers you see that “other people buy weird stuff”, or at least that they buy different items from you.

The few items in common in any two trolleys are, of course, most likely to be those items that sell in large volumes.  These will appear in many more people’s trolleys.  Even so most of the items in our trolley will not be from the ‘top 1000′ and so hardly anyone else will buy them.

The Double Jeopardy Law tells us that an item with low market share will be repeat-bought less often than its rivals, but not dramatically less often, the main reason that it sells so little is that few people ever buy it.  Which means that many of the many low selling items in a supermarket are, in effect, being stocked for just a few consumers.  Some may even be stocked for a single household.  But for these few buyers these items are important, they buy them, maybe not that often (but that’s true of most things we buy), they know them, they are in their heads and their pantries – but not many other people’s.

Because we buy these items we like stores that stock them.  We each enter a store looking for “our stuff”. If the store doesn’t stock the things we buy we can sometimes find ourselves inconvenienced.  We want to see, and be able to find, the items of interest to us.  That makes a store attractive to us.  Fortunately for store managers consumers are extraordinarily good at filtering out all the brands and SKUs that aren’t in their personal repertoire and finding their brands.  Successful stores make this even easier for consumers.

So my point is don’t make the mistake of thinking that a store can do without 90%+ of its range.  Stores compete for shoppers, and shoppers vary enormously in what they look for, in what mental structures are in their head, in what they see.  Each of us has a very different opinion on what the store should stock.  To win us all stores need a wide range.

The danger of chasing market share and trying to harm competitors

It might seem odd for the author of “How Brands Grow” to warn against aiming to grow market share, but here I’m offering a reminder that growth should be an outcome of a strategy to grow profits – profits should not be sacrificed for growth, and especially not for the goal of harming competitors.

We all know that market share growth can deliver increased profits.  But we also know that it can also decimate profits.

It’s fine to aim for share gains, so long as the strategy is carefully developed so that the share gains really do deliver profits.  Because research shows that companies that focus on profits are more profitable, while companies that aim for winning market share from competitors are LESS profitable, and more likely to go broke.

Here is a short essay by Wharton and Ehrenberg-Bass Institute Professor Scott Armstrong which does a pretty good job of summarising his extensive research on this topic.

The Dangers of a Competitor Orientation

Question: Do profits improve when firms attempt to gain market share?

If you believe in the common wisdom of students, managers, and professors of marketing, the answer would be “yes.” However, the evidence tells a different story.

Fred Collopy and I summarized prior research consisting of nearly 30 previously published empirical studies. Twenty-three different laboratory experiments were conducted with 43 groups spaced over many years and countries. In addition, we analyzed 54 years of field data for 20 companies to compare companies that used market share as an objective versus those that focused only on profits. Our research extended over a decade. The results from all approaches showed that market-share objectives harmed profits and put the survival of firms at risk (Armstrong and Collopy 1996).

The paper was difficult to publish. Reviewers disagreed with our findings and seemed intent on blocking publication. They kept finding what they thought to be serious problems with the research. When we would respond to their criticisms with additional experiments, they became incensed. In all, it took about five years to get through the review process. In the end, an editor over-ruled the reviewers.

In a follow-up paper, Kesten Green and I described new evidence from 12 studies that were conducted since the 1996 publication. The new evidence provided further support for the conclusion that competitor-oriented objectives are harmful. In fact, there has been no empirical evidence to date to challenge this conclusion.

While our research has received much attention (e.g., 167 citations for the 1996 paper), it seems to have had little effect on what is learned in business schools.

In teaching the introductory marketing class to Wharton MBAs, I would present the results of this research. This proved to be upsetting to many students as it conflicted with their beliefs and with what they said they were learning in other courses. After one session in which I described this research, an MBA class representative came to me with the “friendly advice” that the students did not appreciate hearing about my research; they would prefer to know what is going on in the real world.

To illustrate the dangers of a competitor-orientation, I also used an experiential exercise known as the “dollar auction” (Shubik 1971). In this exercise, the top two bidders pay, but only the top bidder wins the dollar. Typically the bidding would start at a penny, then move up at an increasing rate. I always made money on the dollar auction. But in 1982, I had my most successful session when I received over $20 for my dollar. I have kept in touch with the 2nd highest bidder, Ravi Kumar, over the years. On a recent trip to India, Ravi reminded me of the name of the winning bidder – Raj Rajaratnam, a hedge-fund manger who was found guilty of insider trading in May 2011, and who is suspected of funding suicide bombers in Sri Lanka (New York Times May 12 stories starting on the front page). Apparently I failed to convince Mr. Rajaratnam that a competitor orientation is harmful to oneself as well as to others.

Professor J Scott Armstrong

References

Armstrong, J.S and K. C. Green, “Competitor-oriented Objectives: The Myth of Market Share,” International Journal of Business, 12 (2007), 117-136.

Armstrong, J.S. and F. Collopy (1996), “Competitor Orientation: Effects of Objectives and Information on Managerial Decisions and Profitability,” Journal of Marketing Research, 33 (1996), 188-199.

Shubik, M. (1971), “The Dollar Auction game: A paradox in noncooperative behavior and escalation,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 15, 109-111.

Getting emotional about brands – the real New Coke story

I was recently asked a question by an astute member of the audience: “what about New Coke?”

The implication being, that if consumers rarely feel deep emotional bonds towards the brands they buy then why the rejection of New Coke?

It was a very good question.

On the spot I answered that one of the few times that people do get emotional about brands is when you take something away from them, particularly when you do it in a very public noticeable way. Psychologists talk about the endowment effect, how people tend to place a much higher value on something they already have than something they are offered. Also people are much more adverse to loss than they are attracted to gains.

I think this is a pretty reasonable answer but it turns out that there is more to the New Coke story…., read on…

The story of New Coke is now a marketing legend. Covered by many a textbook and still regularly referred to by marketing consultants. The story goes like this….. worried by ‘The Pepsi Challange’ taste test Coca-Cola executives decided to change Coke to make it sweeter and more likely to win in blind taste tests with consumers. So a new formula was devised and in a bold move Coca-Cola’s time-honoured taste was changed and launched with national advertising and publicity. Cans carried the message “New”. But the American public hated the idea of a classic like Coke being tampered with. They complained and refused to buy. Coca-Cola realised their mistake and brought back “Classic Coke” which quickly became the norm and “New Coke” was phased out of production. It was considered a huge marketing mistake, although some conspiracy theorists proposed that it was all part of a master plan by Coca-Cola corporation to get publicity.

So goes the legend but the real story doesn’t fit marketing theory quite so neat and tidily.

Coke’s share price actually went up when it introduced the flavour change. Earlier Coke bottlers gave the CEO of Coke a standing ovation when he announced their plans. Sales did not dive when the new formula was introduced, they rose. So the degree of consumer backlash has been exaggerated, and wasn’t immediate. Resistance came from the South, around Atlanta Coca-Cola Corporation’s home. Here were people who felt they owned part of Coke, who felt current management didn’t have the right to change things. And here consumer backlash was highly visible to Coke executives many of whom lived in the South.

The legend that developed later served Coke well. The idea that Americans loved Coke so dearly that they demanded its return and were reminded of their love.  If I worked for Coke it would be a myth I’d be happy with.

Fast advertising is good advertising

What I mean is that the faster a consumer can understand your advertising the better. They should not only be willing to watch it (over and over) but it should also be EASY for them to realise that it’s you advertising. If they only see a portion of it, they should still understand who is selling and what they are selling.

Take care in straying from this advice.

Can you use facebook to stimulate your fans to talk about you?

Since the Advertising Age covered the Ehrenberg-Bass Institute’s analysis of facebook’s ‘talking about’ metric there has been a flurry of internet coverage.

The findings got reduced to a sound bite of “only 1% of facebook fans engage with brands”. Which could easily be misinterpreted. Dr Karen Nelson-Field’s result is actually that around 0.4% (ie less than one percent) of the fans of a brand actually interact with it on facebook in a typical wek.

The interaction is what facebook report as “Talking about’, and includes activity such as to like, comment on or share a Brand Page post (or other content on a page, like photos, videos or albums), post to a Page’s Wall, answer a posted question, liking or sharing a check-in deal, RSVP to an event, mention a Page in a post, phototag a Brand Page…all the activity that facebook measure.

Now 0.4% in a week doesn’t sound so bad. It sounds like it might cumulate to near 25% in a year, but this would be a heroic assumption. In these sorts of social phenomenon we usually see highly skewed distributions. There will be a small percent of fans who do most of the talking every week. So this probably cumulates to something much less than 10% in a year. Karen is investigating.