Answering critics

Our critics have been few, and rather kind (nothing of substance has been raised).

Now and then a marketing guru issues a thinly disguised advertisement for their consulting services that tries to have a go at the laws and strategy conclusions in How Brands Grow.  They usually say something like:

“Our data confirms that larger market share brands have much higher market penetration BUT our whizz-bang proprietary metric also correlates with market share, and this proves that it drives sales growth, profits, share price, and whether or not you will be promoted to CMO”.

Often some obscure statistical analysis is vaguely mentioned, along with colourful charts, and buzzwords like:
algorithm
machine learning
emotional resonance
neuroscience

And sexy sounding (but meaningless) metrics along the lines of:
brand love
growth keys
brand velocity
true commitment
loyalty intensity

All of this should raise warning bells amongst all but the most gullible.

Let me explain the common mistakes….

Ehrenberg-Bass say brands grow only by recruiting new customers.
These critics somehow missed the word “double” in Double Jeopardy.  Larger brands have higher penetration, and all their loyalty metrics are a bit higher too, including any attitudinal metrics like satisfaction, trust, bonding… you name it.

Brands with more sales in any time period, are bought by more people in that time period.  So if you want to grow you must increase this penetration level.  In subscription markets (like home loans, insurance, some medicines) where each buyer has a repertoire of around 1, then penetration growth comes entirely from recruiting new customers to the brand.  In repertoire markets penetration growth comes from recruitment and increasing the buying frequency of the many extremely light customers who don’t buy you every period.

The “double” in Double Jeopardy tells us that some of the sales growth also comes from existing, heavier customers becoming a little more frequent, a little more brand loyal.  Also their attitudes towards the brand will improve a bit, as attitudes follow behaviour.

Improved mental and physical availability across the whole market are the main real world causes of the changes in these metrics.  The brand has become easier to buy for many of the buyers in the market, it is more regularly in their eyesight to be chosen, and more regularly present in their subconscious, ready to be recalled at the moment of choice.

Why does it matter anyway? Can’t we just build loyalty AND penetration?
Yes, that’s what Double Jeopardy says will happen if you grow.

Loyalty and penetration metrics are intrinsically linked.  They reflect the buying propensities of people in the market – propensities that follow the NBD-Dirichlet distribution and Ehrenberg’s law of buying frequencies.  Growth comes from nudging everyone’s propensity up just a little bit.  Because the vast majority of buyers in the market are very light buyers of your brand this nudge in propensities is seen largely amongst this group – a lot go from buying you zero times in the period to buying you once, so your penetration metric moves upwards (as do all other metrics, including attitudes).

For a typical brand hitting even modest sales/share targets requires doubling or tripling quarterly penetration, while only lifting average purchase rate by a fraction of one purchase occasion.  That tells us that we need to seriously reach out beyond ‘loyalists’, indeed beyond current customers, if we are to grow.

When budgets are limited (i.e. always) it’s tempting to think small and go for low reach, but this isn’t a recipe for growth, or even maintenance.

A focus on penetration ignores emotional decision making.
This is odd logic.  A focus on mental and physical availability explicitly realises that consumers are quick emotional decision makers, who make fast largely unthinking decisions to buy, but who if asked will then rationalise their decision afterwards.

Ehrenberg-Bass say there is no loyalty.
On page 92 of “How Brands Grow” we write:
“Brand loyalty – a natural part of buying behaviour.  Brand loyalty is part of every market”.

On page 38 of our textbook  “Marketing: theory, evidence, practice” we write:
“Loyalty is everywhere.  We observe loyal behaviour in all categories” followed by extensive discussion of this natural behaviour.

In FMCG categories, buyers are regularly and measurably loyal – but to a repertoire of brands, not to a single brand.  And they are more loyal to the brands they see a bit more regularly, and buy a bit more regularly.

All brands enjoy loyalty, bigger brands enjoy a little bit more.

Ehrenberg-Bass analysis was only cross-sectional.
Actually, we published our first longitudinal analysis way back in 2003 (McDonald & Ehrenberg) titled “What happens when brands lose or gain share?”.  This showed, unsurprisingly, that brands that grew or lost share mainly experienced large change in their penetration.  This report also analysed which rival brands these customers were lost to or gained from.

In 2012 Charles Graham undertook probably the largest longitudinal analysis ever of buying behaviour, examining more than six years of changes in individual-level buying that accompanied brand growth and decline.  This highlighted the sales importance of extremely light buyers.

In 2014 we published a landmark article in the Journal of Business Research showing that sales and profit growth/decline was largely due to over or under performance in customer acquisition, not performance in retaining customers.  Far earlier we had explained that US car manufacturers did not experience a collapse in their customer retention when Japanese brands arrived, they each suffered a collapse in their customer acquisition rates.

But if we can change attitudes then surely that will unlock growth?

It’s rare that it’s a perceptual problem holding a brand back.  Few buyers reject any particular brand (and even most of these can be converted without changing their minds first).  The big impediment to growth is usually that most buyers seldom notice or think of our brand, and that the brand’s physical presence is less than ideal.

For more on “Marketing’s Attitude Problem” see chapter 2 of “Marketing: theory, evidence, practice” (Oxford University Press, 2013.

Attitudes can predict (some) behaviour change.  Light buyers with strong brand attitude were more likely to increase their buying next year.  And heavy buses with weak brand attitude were more likely to decrease their buying next year.

The real discovery here is that a snapshot of buying behaviour (even a year) misclassifies quite a few people.  Some of the lights are normally heavier but were light that particular year.  Some of the heavies were just heavy that year (kids party, friends visited, someone dropped a bottle) and next year revert closer to their normal behaviour.  Note: for many product categories just a couple of purchases is needed to move someone into, or out of, the heavy buyer group.

Attitudes tend to reflect any buyer’s longer-term norm.  So someone who is oddly heavy in buying this year will tend to be less attitudinally loyal to the brand than ‘regular’ heavies.  Someone who is oddly light this year will tend to be more attitudinally loyal to the brand.  Next year, odds are, their buying moves closer to their norm and their expressed attitude.

This statistical ‘regression to the mean’ is not real longer-term change in behaviour of the kind marketers try to create.  Nor does this show that attitudes cause behaviour – their real influence is very weak, while the effect of behaviour on attitudes is much stronger.

Ehrenberg-Bass analysis is very linear reductionist, whereas we take a quadratic holistic approach.
Really not sure what these critics are talking about, nor perhaps do they.  This is pseudo-science.

I have a super large, super special data set.
Please put the data in the public domain, or at least show the world some easy-to-understand tables of data.  If you want us to consider your claims seriously then please don’t hide behind obscure statistics and jargon.

I have data that shows Ehrenberg-Bass are wrong, but can’t show it.
MRDA.

Politically incorrect trumps scientifically incorrect

Kevin Roberts has resigned (as head coach of Publicis Groupe, executive chairman of Saatchi & Saatchi/Fallon, and member of the Publicis Groupe management board) due to the storm of indignation after he made some mildly politically incorrect comments –  he essentially said he thought sexism was worse in other sectors than it was in the advertising industry.

As a feminist I don’t think this does our cause any good, more important issues (e.g. how few female members of parliament we have, child marriage, and FGM) are being drowned out by issues that are easy to sell to the spoilt and trendy.  I agree with Joanna Williams’ analysis of the affair.

As a marketing Professor I’m  dismayed how, in comparison, the marketing community saw little problem with Kevin Robert’s decades of Brandlove nonsense; indeed many snapped up his silly book, built their brand metric systems on his ideas, and so on.  It seems that marketers find it much easier to identify the politically incorrect than the scientifically incorrect.

Similarly fellow members of the Publicis management board had no problem with Kevin selling nonsense to advertisers (if it makes money…?) .  Nor did they have any problem with someone without a marketing degree being “head coach” for their staff, most of whom are young and also without formal marketing training.

No wonder marketers aren’t taken seriously.

 

Milking Brands for financial manipulation

It’s tempting to convert brand value into temporary profits or sales.

For publicly traded companies the goal is sometimes to fool the financial markets into the thinking the company is healthier than it is. Some managers even say they have to do what they do in order to maintain the share price.  The ethics, and even legality of such practice is questionable.  Of course, converting brand value into temporary sales or profits really lowers the value of a company (and so will eventually lower market capitalization).

Here are the sorts of tricks managers use to hit immediate financial targets.

1. Cut advertising spend.  For many packaged goods companies, advertising spend is equal to profits; or put another way if they didn’t advertise they could post double their normal profits for the year.  So this gives management quite a lot of room to fill profit short-falls simply by reducing advertising spend.  Of course this will depress sales, and therefore profit contribution, but the net effect will be a jump in profits.  Next year sales will be even lower however, and will require more advertising to fix, or greater cuts to advertising to hide the reduction in profit contribution.  A trick to hide reductions in advertising spend is to claim that marketing mix modelling or digital initiatives are delivering much greater efficiency so that the company can afford to cut advertising.  As a marketing professor I can say that there are very good reasons not to buy this argument – financial analysts should beware of it.

2. More price promotion.  The problem with cutting advertising is that sales revenue tends to also decline, probably not by much at first, but eventually the losses start to climb, and brands can risk being de-listed by retailers.  So another trick is to replace some of the advertising cut with price promotions.  These help fix (hide) sales declines.

3. Call discounts “marketing expenditure”.  The problem with price promotions is that while they boost volume sales they decimate profitability and can even lower sales revenue.  This can be fixed by registering sales as full price sales, not the discounted price they were really sold at, and instead booking the discount as a marketing expense (e.g. “trade marketing incentive”).  This increased marketing cost can be useful to assay  investment analysts who are worried that the company is inflating sales and profits by cutting the marketing budget (using the first two tricks above).

Few companies fully disclose and breakdown their marketing expenditure.  This makes it easier for them to use such tricks to fool shareholders and potential investors.  And ensure that management hit their performance targets.

It’s not just consumer goods companies that use such tricks.  One automotive company told me that it’s common practice for manufacturers to ring their car dealers if they are going to miss a sales target and offer them cash payments if they can sell x number of cars/trucks in the few remaining days in the quarter/year.  “Yes, no trouble” says each dealer, and then books a number of sales as they ‘sell’ these cars from one of the dealer’s registered companies to another of the dealer’s own companies.  Then a “demo model” sign is placed on the cars along with a new discounted price (in effect paid for by the manufacturer).  The car manufacturer hits their sales target, and books full price sales, they just register the money they paid the dealer as a marketing expense (possibly paid for out of the advertising budget).  Of course, hitting sales targets next period will be even more difficult because there are just as many unsold cars sitting on the dealers’ lots.

Digital advertising viewability – a useful guide

In online advertising there is currently much controversy about charging advertisers for ads that could never be seen by consumers. In November 2014 Google, to their credit, issued a report that showed that only around half of the ads that were served by their servers were ever able to be viewed (e.g. many viewers did not scroll down far enough for it to appear on their computer or smartphone screen). Even more extraordinary, this figure of half the ad ‘impressions’ being (potentially) viewable was based on a very generous definition of “viewable”, that is, that at least 50% of the ads pixels were onscreen for one second or more. Unsurprisingly leading advertisers are calling for higher standards of viewability, in June 2015 Unilever’s Chief Marketing Officer Keith Weed said that only 100% viewability is acceptable, that for an online ad to count as an impression 100% of the ad needs to be onscreen not merely served by the web server to the web browser or app.

Of course Keith’s right, we don’t want to pay for vapourware, but we don’t have to, even if new standards of viewability are not agreed upon we can now easily calculate a figure closer to reality simply by halving the impression score. Or, put another way, double the CPM (cost per thousand impressions).

That gets us much closer to the truth, but not quite there though.  Another consideration for online video and display ads is the problem is that some of the impressions that are served, and paid for by advertisers, are not reaching humans. Audience impression figures are inflated by views by other computers (‘spiders’ and ‘robots’) rather than actual humans. Some of this fake traffic is even fraudulent where firms collect money for delivering referrals to web sites, inflating their ratings. Fake clicks and video views can also be generated, often by virus software running on the computers of unsuspecting consumers. Major providers of online advertising space such as Facebook and Google have anti-fraud teams devoted to detecting this activity but it remains a problem. It’s difficult to know how large a problem it is, as many of the people reporting statistics have in interest in over-stating the problem (e.g. firms who sell anti-fraud solutions) or under-stating the problem (e.g. firms who sell on-line advertising space). In November 2014 Kraft is the US reported that it rejects more than three quarters of digital ad impressions deeming them “fraudulent, unsafe or non-viewable or unknown”.

That figure sounds about right given the Google research (others report similar numbers) and the fact that some impressions are non-human.

So about one in four online ad impressions is an actual opportunity to see (OTS) for a real human viewer.  However, we can’t assume each ad impression is always actually seen, and therefore able to affect memory, we have to discount for the perceptual filters and inattention of these human beings.  This is true for any media, an OTS is an opportunity for our ads to be seen not a guarantee.  Just how much this varies by media, and by situation, is something that we are researching now in the Ehrenberg-Bass Institute.  It will be some time before we have the solid empirical evidence needed to accurate compare the impact on brains of an OTS in different media.  But until then we can still make meaningful comparisons between media at least in terms of the OTS, and a good guide for digital seems to be to quadruple the cost of each impression in order to compare it to another medium.

Professor Byron Sharp
Ehrenberg-Bass Institute
University of South Australia

PS Google Ad Networks have announced that they are about to change bidding for CPM (per thousand impressions) to vCPM, which means you only pay for viewable ad impressions.  Unfortunately viewable still merely means “when 50 percent of your ad shows on screen for one second or longer for display ads, and two seconds or longer for video ads”.  So an important step in the right direction, now we have something closer to what would count as an OTS (or impression) in other media.

PPS Google suggest that you’ll need to double your old CPM bids now they are using vCPM.  This is inline with the research cited at the start of this article.

Less is known about advertising than we think

It strikes me as very odd when people say things like “we have much to learn about [insert new media], it’s not like TV that we know so well”.

Know so well?!?  How many marketers have heard of the ‘Duplication of Viewing Law’ (Goodhardt, 1966*) ?  How many can predict a repeat-viewing rate for a program, time-slot, or channel?  Even what is known isn’t well known (nor used).

There are so many unanswered questions.  Even simple questions like is an ad spot on the left hand side of a page is worth less or more than one on the right?  And how much?

Not enough is known about how we should best use media to expose category buyers to our advertising.  Let alone how these exposures reach brains.  And this is true for even ‘old media’ like TV and print.  So much that needs to be researched.  It’s extraordinary how ignorant many marketers (and marketing academics) are about our discipline’s fundamental ignorance.

Byron Sharp, July 2015.

* Published in the most cited journal in the world, Nature (and yes the date is correct, 1966).  Yet try to find a marketing textbook that covers it (not counting this one).

What causes the Double Jeopardy law?

I was recently asked for a causal explanation of marketing’s Double Jeopardy pattern.

This is discussed in How Brands Grow (e.g. table 3.3 and surrounding text). Also see page 113 of my textbook. Though the most complete explanation is in the forthcoming “How Brands Grow part 2”.

It’s worth noting that causal explanations turn out to be ‘in the eye of the beholder’… e.g. what caused that window to break?
… the speed and mass of the ball resulting in sufficient force to break the molecular bonds in the glass of that window
… Jonny playing baseball on the front lawn when his Mum told him not to
… the wind, the pitch, the sun in Jonny’s eyes
… the Smith’s skimping and not installing double glazing ignoring their builder’s advice

All are better or worse explanations, depending on your point of view.

It’s the same for Double Jeopardy.

One explanation is simply that it’s a scientific law, it describes a bit of the universe, and that’s it… it’s simply how the world is. We don’t tend to ask why is there an opposite and equal reaction for every action (Newton’s first law), there just is.

The statistical explanation of Double Jeopardy is that it is a selection effect. Because  brand share depends largely on mental and physical availability, rather than differentiated appeals of different brands.  For marketers this is pretty important, pretty insightful, we wouldn’t get Double Jeopardy if brands were highly differentiated appealing to different segments of the market.  Since we do see Double Jeopardy all over the place that suggests that real-world differentiation is pretty mild.  Mental and physical availability must be a much bigger story than differentiation.  That’s a very important insight.

Trade not boycotts helps poor people and the environment

There is far more trade between countries today than ever before.  And it has allowed countries that were terribly poor, with awful rates of childhood mortality, to transform themselves.

If you haven’t seen this superb video by Professor Hans Rosling then please do.  It shows the amazing progress that has been made.

This progress is often forgotten by people who instead give gloomy summations of the world today.  And worse, some of these people blame globalisation.  Trade is even presented as evil, forcing peasants to leave their (cold wet) rice farm to work in ugly city factories (better paid, warm, with healthcare, career prospects).  Somehow it’s thought that these dumb peasants don’t know what is good for them and their children – they are portrayed as victims of globalisation.

The statistics in Hans Rosling’s video help dispel this dystopian (patronising) fantasy.

I hope that facts like this help people to realise that trade gives people in poor countries a positive future.

If all the rich people in rich countries had agreed not to buy any goods from factories in Asia until they met our environmental and labour standards then Japan would be a poor backward country today. Child mortality in Asia would be atrocious, as it was only 50 years ago.  We must never forget this.